Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom by Schlicht, Ekkehart
Schlicht, Ekkehart:
Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom











First we may observe, that the supposition, 
that the future resembles the past, is not founded on 
arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from 
habit., by which we are determined to expect for the 
future the same train of objects, to which we have 
been accustomed. 
David Hume (1740, 134) 
Customs, habits, and routines provide the bedrock for many economic and 
social formations yet our understanding of the processes that underlie the growth 
and decay of customs is very limited. The theory of social evolution has hardly 
commenced to evolve. 
The 'clarity' view of custom proposed in my recent book On Custom in the 
Economy posits the desire of individuals to detect patterns in their social 
environment and to act in a patterned fashion. They have a 'rule preference', and 
this gives rise to the formation of customs and social evolution. In this essay, I offer 
some supplementary arguments which support this position from the perspective 
of learning theory and evolutionary psychology. 
The first issue to be dealt with relates to learning (Sections 2 to 8). What 
processes should we envisage for the way in which the rules of custom are learned 
by individuals in a society? Obviously the rules of custom and social interaction 
must be learned. It is usually taken for granted that this learning proceeds in an 
adaptive way, and it is assumed that people find out one way or another what is 
best for them and adjust their behavior accordingly. Social experimentation goes 
on without respite. Competitive forces select more successful behavior and enforce 
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it on the individuals. In the end, a social structure emerges from this process of 
incessant mutual re-adjustment. This picture, drawn notably by theorists dealing 
with social evolution, is, however, ambiguous.1 It leaves the question open as to 
whether the rules of custom grow out of  experience, or whether people 
experiment with alternative rules and select the best from the set. Both theoretical 
alternatives have been pursued in the literature in a cursory fashion, and without 
expanding on detail. I shall refer to the first view as 'rule inductivism' and to the 
second as 'rule structuralism'. Neither view can give an adequate account of rule 
formation and the processes underlying the assimilation of customary behavioral 
patterns (Section 2 to 5). 
A close examination of rule learning reveals that learning processes are 
intimately tied up with evaluations of an aesthetic kind, relating to formal features 
like symmetry, analogy, or good continuity. This observation leads to a third 
alternative, rule-aestheticism, which takes the middle ground between inductivism 
and structuralism. It offers a more satisfactory account of the learning processes 
that channel social evolution and is described in Sections 6 to 8. 
The issue of rule learning will be discussed in a very simple setting. I shall 
concentrate almost exclusively on conventions, which are rules that solve 
co-ordination problems and where it is best for each individual to follow the 
convention if others do the same. Keeping on the right hand side of the road is an 
example. Conventions, in contrast to many other prescriptions of custom, do not 
pose enforcement problems. This permits concentration on fundamental aspects of 
learning processes. 
The processes of learning are of particular importance for the social 
sciences because the way people learn influences their behavior and thereby 
moulds the social regularities which are to be learned. In this sense, learning 
processes are of more fundamental significance in the social sciences than, say, in 
physics, where a physicist may neglect the fact that the way he thinks is part of 
physical reality and that the aesthetic judgements involved in generating his 
theories play any role in it. We may allow that we would approach problems in 
physics differently if we were endowed with another type of aesthetic sense, but 
we could still be confident that the theories thus developed would describe the 
same physical reality, and would amount, in this sense, to much the same as the 
theories we currently entertain. With regard to social structure, however, we must 
expect that another type of aesthetic sense would have made us settle for quite 
different property or family structures. We would live in a different social world. 
2. Inductivism 
Let me consider learning first, and how people learn the rules of custom. 
One view of rule formation posits that rules are formed inductively from 
experience. Adam Smith envisaged the formation of the rules of moral conduct in 
this manner: 
1 Boyd/Richerson-1985. 
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"Our continual obseroations upon the conduct of others, insensibly 
lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit 
and proper either to be done or to be avoided. It is thus that the general 
rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon our 
experience of what, in particular circumstances, our moral faculties, our 
natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of We do 
not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon 
examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain 
general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding out 
from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a 
certain manner, are approved or disapproved of ,� 
A similar position may be found in modern game theory where it is 
maintained that notions of fairness reflect and encode successful strategic behavior 
as learnt and adopted in a process of trial and error, with successful behavior 
maintained, and unsuccessful behavior avoided. Successful behavior is 
summarized in terms of rules. People follow these rules not necessarily because 
they are aware of their usefulness, but for emotional or moral reasons, yet these 
emotional or moral motives are only proximate causes of behavior. The motives 
themselves have been formed because they have generated successful behavior.3 
According to rule inductlvism, customs incorporate the inductively derived 
and emotionally encoded recipes for success. Analysis must penetrate the surface 
phenomena of moral preferences and judgements and zero in on the ultimate 
instrumental causes of customs. Any explanation of custom, it is maintained, must 
start from there. 
3. Structuralism4 
I would like to contrast the inductivist view sketched in the last section 
with another extreme view, labeled 'rule structuralism'. This view can be described 
as follows. There is a set of possible rules like 'you must not lie,' 'you must not 
steal,' or 'you must drive on the right-hand side of the road'. These rules are pre­
fabricated ideas in a Platonic (or Kantian) 'rule-heaven,' given a priori. Humans 
select from this set by adopting certain rules, and rejecting others. The survival of 
certain rules, or certain rule-systems, can be analyzed again in competitive terms. 
The 'better' rules, or 'better' rule-systems, survive and supersede the others. Here 
'better' means competitive dominance, or a faster spread of active rules within the 
population. The concept is akin to biological fitness. 
2 Smith-1759, p. 159. 
3 Binmore/Samuelson-1994, pp. 46-7. 
4 The concept of structuralism is introduced and used here in a very simple way, i.e. by assuming that 
there is a set of pre-fabricated rules (structures) without any finer distinction among them. This is done 
in order to draw attention to the importance of making distinctions within the set of structures, as will 
be elaborated in section 6 below. Current structuralist positions in linguistics or the social sciences are, 
however, more refined and do take some of these aspect into account. 
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In the following I shall, however, not discuss issues of propagation and 
evolution of rule systems, but emphasize the crucial difference between rule 
inductivism and rule structuralism: The former takes rules as generated by 
competitive forces, the latter takes competition as taking place between rules. 
These rules must, therefore, precede competition. 
The position of rule structuralism is shared by many theorists who think 
about the choice of alternative rule-systems, related to constitutional economics, or 
'Wirtschaftsordnungen.'s Some positions in modem institutional economics may, 
in this sense, be classed as structuralist. They characterize institutions as 'humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction,' and interpret them as 'rules' 
which have been selected, or have emerged from competition.6 Rule utilitarians 
can be counted as structuralists, too. They insist that general rules, rather than 
specific actions, are to be selected according to the results they bring about. This 
excludes the option of piecewise optimization. 
4. A Critique of Inductivism7 
Rule inductivism holds that rules are formed by induction from experience. 
This is, however, a position that is difficult to maintain because rules cannot 
emerge from rule-free or otherwise unaided induction. Obviously, induction 
requires ideas about how inductive knowledge is generated. Processes of 
induction can not be conceived as free-floating. They need an anchor. 
Consider the follOWing simple inference problem. An individual sets out to 
learn how to behave at various traffic crossings. He finds out that it is best to take 
action a under circumstances A, action b under circumstances B, and action c 
under circumstances C. Take the simple case of right of way in traffic, and take 
circumstances A, Band C as referring to particular crossings. The following 
characterizations of actions a, b, and c may be conceived: 
a give right of way to cars coming from the right at crossing A 
b give right of way to cars coming from the left at crossing B 
c give right of way to boats crossing from leeward at crossing C 
The individual notes also that crossing A is one particular crossing in 
Munich, crossing B is a crossing in London, and crossing C is a certain crossing of 
waterways on a inlet of the Baltic, near Kiel. Note that formation of the underlying 
notions 'right', 'left', 'windward,' or 'leeward' relies on induction in the sense that 
these characterizations and classifications must have been learned and that all 
individuals have adopted the same classifications. Furthermore, the individual must 
have learnt that the distinction win<;lward-Ieeward is irrelevant on the road, and the 
distinction right-left is irrelevant on the waterway, and that a myriad of other possible 
5 BuchananiBrennan-1985, Buchanan-I994. 
6 North-I990, p. 3. 
7 For the following, see also Goodman-1983, pp. 59-83 and Schlicht-I998, pp. 87-105. 
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distinctions are irrelevant at all crossings. Usually, many other characteristics, like 
north-south, or broad-narrow, may serve to co-ordinate action equally well. If each 
individual had tried to co-ordinate by using another characteristic, the learning of 
co-ordination would have been impossible. If one person tries to find a right of 
way rule, based on the windward-leeward distinction, while his partner 
concentrates on the right-left distinction, and a third individual tries to co-ordinate 
by concentrating on yet another aspect, it will be practically impossible for the 
group to co-ordinate successfully. Furthermore rule learning may involve 
generalizations such as 'in England, always give right of way to vehicles coming 
from the left, but on the continent, give right of way to vehicles coming from the 
right,' and 'stop to traffic from the leeward side on waterways'. Such generalizations 
rest on notions like 'England', 'the continent' or 'waterways'. These, again, must be 
shared by the individuals concerned and must precede any inductive learning of 
general rules. 
All learning rests thus on classifications and distinctions. In order to learn 
co-ordination inductively, the relevant classifications and distinctions used by the 
individuals concerned must have been coordinated beforehand. The individuals 
must have settled spontaneously for matching characteristics as coordinating 
devices, or must have, at least, settled for a few possibilities, such as right-left or 
windward-leeward distinctions, in order to render learning possible. This set of 
alternatives can not be determined inductively, because the vast number of 
theoretical possibilities would frustrate any attempt to single out one particular 
distinction as being the relevant one. A lifetime would not suffice to gather the 
necessary information. 8 
Co-ordination can only emerge from mutually matching inductions drawn 
by the individuals concerned, and from a correlated cognitive structuring of 
experience. Ultimately, the possibility to learn and co-ordinate in social interaction 
rests on cognitive dispositions which are shared by the majority of individuals 
concerned. This fact is theoretically of great significance, but has been neglected in 
many theoretical inquiries. It is all too natural, like breathing, and does not stir up 
any attention. Yet, unlike breathing, the way we make inductions shapes social 
interaction. It cannot be ignored. 
The argument that all learning is rule-bound (which differs, however, from 
the position developed in this paper) has been of great importance in linguistiCS 
regarding the acquisition of language and the learning of grammar rules. It seems 
to be well established that young children learn language guided by an innate 
knowledge of the possible forms of natural language. Without language universals, 
learning would not be possible, as each new achievement is generalized in many 
ways beyond whatever has been experienced before. Language acquisition must 
be understood in structuralist, rather than behaviorist, terms. This seems to be a 
widely accepted view. The debate today concentrates on the question whether the 
universals underlying language acquisition reflect language-specific knowledge or 
8 In linguistics, an analogous argument is used to defend the postulate of a generative grammar. Similar 
problems arise in biology with attempts to explain the evolution of behavior, but are often ignored. (See 
for example Maynard-Smith-1978). 
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general regularities of cognition. The idea of structuralist learning itself remains 
unchallenged.9 
5. A Critique of Structuralism 
The learning of the rules of custom is in many ways very similar to the 
learning of the rules of grammar. It involves many generalizations. If, at a certain 
crossing, we have learnt to give way to traffic coming from the right, we will 
spontaneously and subliminally form the rule 'right before left' and try this in other 
situations - at other crossings, on the sidewalks, etc. This type of generalization -
that one learning event triggers off an entire cluster of other behaviors - is akin to 
the way we learn languages, and is essential for effective learning. 
We have seen that inductivism cannot account for effective rule learning, 
However, structuralism cannot adequately elucidate rule-learning either. The 
simple dichotomy between rules and non-rules is not sufficient to cope with 
learning unless the possibilities are extremely and unrealistically limited. 
To illustrate, consider the following four passing rules, which build on the 
right-left categorization, but add a temporal dimension: 
Rl always keep right 
R2 always keep left 
R3 keep right on odd days (Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and 
Sundays) and keep left on the other days of the week 
R4 keep right on even days (Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays) 
and keep left on the other days of the week 
When trying to learn a passing rule, we start with simple hypotheses like 
Rl or R2. If these do not work, we may try refinements R3 or R4. We would not, 
however, start with rule R3 as a first approximation and then refine it by restricting 
it to odd days and invoke rule R4 for the rest of the week, thereby effectively 
reproducing rule Rl as a combination of rules R3 and R4. This would appear 
unnatural and unWieldy. Yet theoretically it would be a matter of indifference 
whether we took Rl and R2 as our primitive rules, and conceived R3 and R4 as 
refinements, or whether we started from R3 and R4 and took Rl and R2 as 
refinements. If the only possible distinction refers to the one between rules and 
non-rules, all rules are equivalent. There would be no hierarchy in the rule heaven. 
9 See Anderson-1980, p. 352. The position of aestheticism developed in this paper could be applied to 
linguistics, too, and would then challenge certain aspects of linguistic structuralism. See also footnote 11 
below. 
Schlicht. Aestheticism in the Theory of Custom 39 
Without a hierarchy, however, rule learning would not be realistically 
possible. The following example may clarify this thought. We consider the issue of 
driving on the right versus driving on the left and allow for rules that use 
distinctions of weekdays, just as rules Rl to R4 above do. Many other possible 
rules exist that build on the right-left distinction and on the classification of 
weekdays. All in all, 27=128 different rules can be stated. Each such rule may be 
described by a sequence of letters indicating the appropriate behavior on the 
corresponding day of the week. Thus we write Rl=(r, r, r, r, r, r, r) or R4=(/, r, I, r, 
I, r, I). If we allow for all possible rules, there would be no way to learn by 
induction from the past. Each observation on one day would cut future possibilities 
by half, because it would fix the choice of right or left for that particular day, but 
would not carry any implication for the remaining days of the week. Whatever had 
been observed at the beginning of the week will, thus, not help to make 
predictions for the remaining days. 
Rule formation and rule learning will actually proceed differently. Assume 
that behavior of others has been observed on the first five days of the week. On 
each of the first five days, we have observed driving on the right. Our pre­
conceived ideas of simplicity, clarity and straightforwardness would suggest to us 
to expect (r, r) for Saturday and Sunday, and we would confidently assume that 
the others were guided by similar expectations. This would enable smooth co­
ordination on Saturday and Sunday, emerging from a generalization from past 
experience on the preceding weekdays. We would, so to speak, prefer the rule 
Rl=(r, r, r, r, r, r, r) over the rule R5=(r, r, r, r, r, I, D when making inductions. 
Without ideas of simplicity, clarity and continuity, however, no such grading of 
rules would be possible. The rule R5 'drive on the right save on Saturdays and 
Sundays' is a possible rule, just as rule Rl 'drive on the right all the time'. Similar 
observations apply to all possible combinations of driving on the right and driving 
on the left. 
We are, thus, able to learn from past experience, because we prefer certain 
inductions to others, and we happily assume that such a rule preference is a good 
guide for predictions about the future. to 
Note that the induction problem has been discussed above in a very simple 
setting, assuming that other facts had been learnt before. For instance, it has been 
assumed that a 'week' is the relevant time period to consider, and that other than 
right-left categories do not matter. In a more realistic setting, the problem of 
determining which rule is best becomes practically insoluble. 
It would be thus of no great help to restrict the set of rules to a subset, as 
rule structuralism would suggest. If we knew a Priori that you should keep at the 
same side of the road on Saturdays and Sundays, this would no doubt restrict the 
set of possibilities by half. We would not need to learn about Sundays. However, 
10 See Schlicht-1998, Ch. 8. The argument relates closely to Goodman's contention (Goodman-1983). He 
points out that unaided induction is impossible, and proposes the view that the categorizations given in 
language serve this purpose. In a similar vein, and starting from the same problem, Goyal and Janssen 
propose that learning of conventions presupposes some other conventions (GoyaVJanssen-l996). The 
argument presented here would trace the emergence of these categorizations and conventions to clarity 
judgements of an aesthetic kind, ultimately prompted by our psychological make-up. 
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in order to render rule learning possible, the set of alternatives would have to be 
narrowed down drastically. Such a trimming of the rule heaven would be entirely 
unjustified on a priori grounds. 11 Every sequence of right and left could serve as a 
possible rule for coordinating passing on the road. It is only that some rules are 
considered better than others, in a purely aesthetic, non-instrumental sense. This 
induces us to try them out first. The position of structuralism ignores this fact and 
postulates, erroneously, that a clear-cut distinction can be drawn between rules 
and non-rules. 
6. Aestheticism 
Rules cannot be derived from unaided induction. Thus, inductivism, as 
conceived above, is an untenable position. Similarly, structuralism, as conceived 
above, cannot account for rule learning and rule formation, as it rests on an 
untenable categorical distinction between rules and non-rules. The examples given 
above suggest, however, an intermediate position that avoids both extremes and, 
at the same time, can account very naturally for rule formation and rule learning. 
This is the position of rule aestheticism, which will be described presently. 
The basic observation here is that rules can be graded not only with 
respect to their instrumental usefulness, but also with respect to their clarity, 
straightforwardness, and ease of perception and reproduction. Some rules are 
better than others, in this sense. For the purpose of learning, induction, and 
transmission, individuals prefer more attractive to less attractive rules. They have a 
rule preference. This renders it possible to learn from the past. 
Rule preference is of an essentially aesthetic nature. Symmetry, simplicity, 
straightforwardness, analogy, and other formal features contribute to distinguish a 
'good' rule from a 'bad' one. The clarity of a rule is, however, not a number that 
can simply be attached to it, or springs from a calculation of the 'clarity values' of 
its components. Just like beauty 'is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, 
but results from the whole,' the beauty or attractiveness of a rule depends on its 
overall pattern, and how well it fits in with other rules in the prevailing set of 
customs. 12 
This would show up empirically if we tried to measure the clarity of a rule 
by noting what types of rules people prefer and try out first. The rule of walking on 
the right on the sidewalk will appear more attractive on the continent than in Great 
Britain, because it would harmonize with the rules prevailing on the continent, not 
in Britain. Likewise, the rule to drive on the right on weekdays and on the left on 
Sundays would appear better than the rule to drive on the left on every other tenth 
11 1he argument could also be advanced against structural linguistics: 1here is no clear-�t distinction 
to be drawn between correct and incorrect sentences. Some sentences are clear, some are murky, some 
verge on being wrong, and some are definitely wrong from a grammatical point of view. 
12 Hume-1777, p. 292. Let me note that the clarity preference is not to be equated to a preference for 
simplicity, see Schlicht-1998, p. 136. 
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day and on the right otherwise. This depends entirely on the prevailing convention 
of having a seven-day week, rather than a ten-day-week. 
Aesthetic judgements, if shared by the individuals concerned, rendet- it 
possible to solve the pervasive induction problem. Rule detection becomes 
possible because the 'better' rules are tried first, and modifications may only be 
introduced later if necessary. 
This procedure is well illustrated in econometrics, where we start by 
assuming linear relations first. If we allowed for polynomials of arbitrary degree 
from the outset, there would be infinitely many which would fit our data perfectly, 
but there would be no way to decide which of these polynomials to choose. By 
assuming simple relationships first, and introducing modifications when needed, 
we can obtain our results.13 
7. Deeper Levels 
Both the inductivist and the structuralist approach can be refined and 
shifted to more fundamental aspects of learning. This gives rise to sophisticated 
inductivism on the one hand, and sophisticated structuralism on the other. 
Sophisticated inductivism. It may be argued that the rules are formed by 
inductive processes on a higher level. What appears 'simple' or 'clear' to us is not 
simple or clear in any objective sense but is perceived as thus because it is 
advantageous to form this, and no other, notion of simplicity and clarity. Evolution 
has taught us to form such notions in the most expedient way. This argument 
points to a theoretical possibility but seems to me to be of limited bearing, at least 
in the context of the social sciences. We can safely assume that the fundamental 
processes of learning and behavior, which characterize humans, and are shared by 
many animals, are invariant in historical time. We can take mental structure as given. 
On a pragmatic level, psychologists have addressed the issue of induction 
vs. pre-determined structure in concept formation. The inductivist position was that 
a concept - say, of a bird - refers to an average specimen which we most frequently 
13 This is the well-known identification problem in econometrics. If arbitrary functional fonns are 
permitted for a regression equation, there will be infinitely possibilities to obtain a perfect fit for the 
past, with arbitrarily many associated predictions for the future. The problem is solved in econometrics 
by trying 'simple' functional forms (like straight lines, quadratic or logarithmic functions) first. 
It is to be noted here that this is not Simply a matter of the number of parameters involved, although the 
problem is usually discussed in this way. It is true that a linear equation y-a+bx involves only the two 
parameters a and b, but this holds true for 
100 xt . 
y= a + b Z --, as well, and infinitely many other two-parameter functions are conceivable. 
i-1 /og(i) 
In particular, for each set of obselVations (Xt, Yt)t=1,2, ... T and any prediction (Xt, Yt)t=T+ 1,T+2, ... T+z 
there will exist infinitely many polynomials y = P(x) which will yield a prefect fit. Estimating the 
equation y-a+b.P(x) will give the estimates a-O and b= 1, but this kind of perfect regression will tell us 
nothing about predictions because we can obtain all predictions we like in this way. 
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encounter, and we form the concept of a bird that fits best in most cases. The other 
alternative was that abstract features such as symmetry and clarity rather than 
frequent exposure or other practical concerns govern concept formation. It turns 
out that such abstract features and, in particular, the context in which observations 
occur, are very important for concept formation.I4 This is also evident in our 
everyday experience with the decimal system. The most prominent numbers here 
are 1, 10, 100, etc., but these are not the numbers we use most frequently. In the 
sexagesimal system which we use with timepieces, the numbers 60, 120, 180 and 
240 are prominent. Such clarity judgements are driven by the number system in the 
first place, rather than by frequent exposure. Sometimes, frequent exposure is the 
result of, rather than the cause for, clarity features. We have, for example, television 
films which fit into 60 minute time-slots, and videotapes which are gauged to this 
rhythm. 
Sophisticated structuralism. The observation that mental structure must be 
taken as fixed and given in historical time may suggest, again, a structural view of a 
more refined kind. Sophisticated structuralism forms its beginning from the idea 
that rule learning is rule-bound itself. Thus, it may be urged, there must be rules for 
learning rules. The 'deep' rules are genetically determined. They enable us to learn 
and to make inductions. This kind of structuralism could be developed in full 
analogy with linguistic structuralism. In linguistic structuralism, it is maintained that 
children are genetically equipped with a 'generative' grammar which enables them 
to learn any language which happens to be spoken by their caretakers in an 
extremely efficient manner. The generative grammar is, thus, a set of rules for making 
rules. If applied in full analogy to the social sciences, this kind of structuralism 
would maintain that humans are equipped with a 'generative social structure' 
which produces, in interaction with prevailing circumstances and historical 
conditions, any social structure we may observe. 15 
Sophisticated structuralism need not be conceived in such a modular 
manner, however. Just as cognitive dispositions enabling language acquisition may 
not be language specific, the cognitive dispositions enabling the learning of the 
rules of social interaction may be of a general nature, rather than specific to social 
interaction. We need neither postulate a separate language module nor assume a 
separate social module in our cognitive organization, as both language acquisition 
and social learning phenomena may stem from a general ability to learn rules. 
8. Structuralism and Aestheticism 
Structuralism, in its sophisticated non-modular version, distinguishes 
between a generative structure, genetically given, and the realized social �tructure 
14 See Anderson-I990, pp. 137-145 and Schlicht-I998, pp. 75-86 for further discussion. 
. , 
15 This would be one reading of Aristotele's 'hexis' or Pirker's and Rauchenschwandtner's 'sense of 
community', see Pirker/Rauchenschwandtner-I998, pp. 410-11. 
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or a rule system which we actually observe. A set of generative rules constitutes the 
'deep structure'. It generates, in interaction with prevailing social and historical 
conditions, the particular rule systems we observe in different societies. 
In contrast, aestheticism places great emphasis on the necessity of grading 
possible rules according to clarity and straightforwardness. It has been urged that a 
non-instrumental, or aesthetic, preference for clear rules must be presupposed. 
This rule preference induces people to try the clear rules first. This makes 
induction and rule learning possible. However, the grading of rules according to 
clarity has been described without referring to the different layers of rules such as 
deep generative and superficial actual rules. In this, the proposed view of rule 
learning deviates from structuralism. The position seems preferable for purposes of 
social analysis, as a distinction between different layers of rules is neither necessary 
nor simplifying. Furthermore, it is not obvious that a categorical distinction can 
usefully be made between generative and actual rules, as it seems that any rule, 
once adopted, may serve to generate other rules. 
This is partially a semantic issue. Consider the case of rules to keep to one 
side on the footpath and on the street. Let (r, I) denote the case that you keep to 
the right on the footpath and to the left on the street. Assume a society with 
footpaths, but no streets, and where the rule was established to keep to the right 
on the footpath. With the introduction of carriages and carts, the necessity arose for 
streets and a rule for their use. The alternatives were, to select either (r, r) or (r, I) 
as a rule system. Rule preference would suggest the first alternative. Hence the 
previously established rule 'Keep to the right on the footpath' entails the derived 
rule 'keep to the right on the street'. In this sense, the first rule helped to generate 
the second. More generally, any rule can serve as a generative rule in so far as 
clarity judgements depend on context, and any rule can serve as an element in the 
context for the establishment of another rule. In this sense, a distinction between 
generative and superficial rules seems unwarranted. 
We may phrase the same reasoning in terms of generative rules, however. 
The prescription: 'keep to the same side on the footpath and on the street' may be 
considered a generative rule in this case. As a matter of semantics, we may, in this 
vein, conceive that any principle which establishes a preference for a certain rule 
over another one, is a generative rule. 
But semantic choices are rarely innocuous, as they ease certain types of 
arguments and impair others. In this sense, the semantic choice of distinguishing 
between generative and superficial structures seems unfortunate. This becomes 
evident in the cases where simplicity judgements and analogies are important. The 
rule 'go for simple rules' presupposes simplicity judgements, which could, in 
principle, be stated by some rules that describe the processes generating such 
judgements. These could then be taken as generative rules. In a similar vein, the 
rule 'treat similar cases analogously' can be traced to some generative rules which 
describe the way we form Similarity judgements and analogies. Such a parlance in 
terms of generative structures seems unnecessarily cumbersome, however. It may 
be preferable to point directly to the types of judgement on which rule formation 
builds. These processes have been described here as 'aesthetic,' in the sense 
of involving judgements about clarity, similarity, analogy, and coherence. The 
alternative of phrasing these judgements in terms of the processes which generate 
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them tends to overemphasize the algorithmic aspect of rule formation and thereby 
obscure the all-important judgmental aspect.16 
Furthermore, the reduction of judgements to the processes underlying 
them may render the argument unnecessarily prolix, possibly up to the point 
where the straightforward judgmental processes involved in rule formation 
become buried in a heap of conjectures about psychological processes which are 
largely irrelevant to rule formation. If we look at a mathematical theorem, for 
instance, we can undoubtedly identify its truth with the proof given for the 
theorem, and the rules that govern the relevant reasoning. Yet there are many 
different proofs conceivable for any given theorem, and we may conceive the truth 
thereof as independent of the proofing procedure, as all different proofs give the 
same result. There are many ways, for instance, to prove Pythagoras' theorem, both 
geometrically and algebraically. The truth of the theorem is independent of the 
particular proof chosen. When we apply the theorem, we suppose that it is true, 
without reference to any particular method of proof. To insist on reconsidering the 
proof over and over again would curb the usefulness of Phythagoras' theorem 
considerably. The theorem is useful because we can take it as given - without the 
underlying processes of proving it again and again. 
In a similar vein, we may approach rule formation as a process which is 
driven by aesthetic judgement, without necessarily enlarging on how these 
aesthetic judgements themselves come about. In this sense, the aesthetic approach 
offers a shortcut which side-steps some issues in evolutionary psychology. The 
question of how aesthetic judgements are generated is largely irrelevant to the 
issue of rule formation. It suffices that these judgements are made, and are 
prompted by human psychological propensities that can be safely assumed as 
given and invariable in historical time. 
This shortcut seems appropriate because the question about the formation 
of aesthetic judgement is fundamental, very difficult, and remains largely 
unresolved in evolutionary theory. Darwin himself emphaSized the difficulty of 
accepting that 'mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish' share the 'high taste of beauty' 
which 'generally coincides with our own standard'.17 Yet, according to him, 
aesthetic taste must be presupposed if we want to understand, for example, the 
phenomena of the peacock's tail-feathers or other Significant features of animals in 
evolutionary terms. He invokes the idea that this sharing of aesthetic judgements 
across species may relate to the idea of common descent of all vertebrates, and that 
'the nerve-cells of the brain in the highest, as well as in the lowest members of the 
Vertebrate series, are derived from those of the common progenitor of this great 
Kingdom.' The range of shared aesthetic judgements required for the present 
purpose is much more restricted, and less demanding, as it relates to humans only, 
and need not apply across species. In view of Darwin's observation on the role of 
beauty in evolution it would, however, be entirely mistaken to reject the relevance 
of aesthetic judgements in social co-ordination on evolutionary grounds. The 
argument that we know very little about the inner mechanisms of the aesthetic 
16 This would be, in the terminology of Kubon-Gilke/Schlicht-1993, pp. 259-60, a 'conceptual 
implication' of the structuralist parlance. 
17 Darwin-1874, p. 640. 
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sense does not imply that aesthetic judgements are irrelevant to biological and 
social evolution. Quite to the contrary: The fact that aesthetic judgements are made 
and widely shared offers a prima fa cie reason for as sum ing that they are 
evolutionarily significant. The importance of aesthetic judgement in learning 
processes offers further, an avenue of thought which may help us to understand 
what Darwin took as a fact: That we are endowed with an aesthetic sense. 
9. Selecting for Learning 
From a biologist's point of view, learning is interpreted as adaptive 
responses brought about by selective pressure. Learning is just a special case of 
adaptation. It involves the gathering and transmission of information. In this sense, 
evolution is a process of learning. We may envisage different levels of adaptation: 
the genetic, the individual, and the social level. Let us consider these in turn. IS 
1. Genetic learning. The process of biological evolution is typically 
envisaged as brought about by variation and selection. Genetic mutation and 
recombination generate variation. While well adapted individuals survive and 
multiply, the less well adapted are pruned off in the struggle for survival. 
Furthermore, the speed and direction of mutations is controlled by genetic 
mechanisms, which have evolved in the same manner. This gives rise to directed 
or patterned, rather than random mutation.I9 
2. Individual learning. However, not all organisms function like genetically 
programmed automata. In changing environments, genetic adaptation is sometimes 
too slow to track change. So some species have acquired the ability to learn and 
thereby to adapt more quickly.20 This type of learning depends on recognizing 
18 Selten-I991, JablonkalLachmann/Lamb-I992, Lachmann!Jablonka-I996, and JablonkalLamb/Avital-
1998 inspire the considerations in this section. Selten-I991, p. 21 distinguishes mutation, changes in 
gene frequencies (which I lump together), cultural transmiSSion, and individual learning and stresses 
the different time dimensions involved. Jablonka, Lamb, and Avital distinguish, however, four 
inheritance systems: the epigenetic inheritance system, the genetic inheritance system, the behavioral 
inheritance system, and the linguistic inheritance system. The above classification amalgamates their 
epigentic and genetic inheritance systems. Further, as I am interested not only in inheritance, but more 
generally in learning, I distinguish here individual learning and social learning, which replaces their 
behavioral and linguistic systems to some measure. The fundamental argument introduced by Jablonka 
et a/., namely, that the different systems have their particular advantages under different conditions and 
will be selected for accordingly, is maintained. 
19 'Some genetic structures do not adapt the organism to its environment. Instead, they have evolved to 
promote and direct the process of evolution. They function to enhance the capacity of the species to 
evolve.' (Campbell-1985, p. 137). Thus, evolutionary processes of variation must be assumed to be 
structured and patterned, rather than random and diffuse, see JablonkalLarnb-I995: Cbs. 3-5 and, with 
respect to social theory, Schlicht-I997. 
20 By the way, this observation puts into question a central tenet of evolutionary psychology, namely that 
evolution would favor domain-specific rather than general solutions in learning. The argument is that 
task-specific optimization is better at each task than any general strategy which could be applied to many 
tasks. (The issue of act-utilitarianism versus rule-utilitarianism re-appears here in a different guise.) The 
counter argument is that repeated task must be expected being automated and even genetically 
assimilated anyway. The raison d'etre of learning is, thus, to cope with new issues in the best possible 
way, but there will be no chance for full optimization. See Shapiro/Epstein-l998 for related discussion. 
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recurrent patterns, identifying similar cases and forming hypotheses in the most 
efficient way. Learning relies on the 'supposition that the future resembles the 
past'.21 Yet our ideas of resemblance must be prompted by correlations in the 
environment.22 They cannot be fine-tuned to any one particular case because they 
constantly have to deal with new ones. This type of learning has proved successful, 
and has evolved, just as directed variation has superseded random mutation at the 
genetic level for evolutionary reasons. 
3. Social learning. Genetic adaptation can be expected to occur in 
environments that remain invariant over time. Learning at an individual level can 
be expected to occur within environments that incessantly present new challenges 
to the individual. On an intermediate time-scale we can imagine changes which 
can neither be tracked by genetic change nor by individual learning in any 
satisfactory way. Let us envisage changes that occur over approximately a hundred 
generations. This time-span is too short to allow for significant genetic adaptation, 
but long enough to make it would be a waste of resources if each individual had to 
learn anew about the environment. Under such circumstances, it is more efficient 
for the individual simply to copy the behavior of others, rather than to find out 
about the environment on his own. This is when sOcial leaming evolves, and social 
tradition forms. In this social context learning relies on pattern recognition. 
However, the individual will be concerned with detecting patterns in the behavior 
of its conspecifics, rather than learning about the natural environment directly, 
which would be more costly. Once the customary behavioral patterns are 
assimilated, the individual may, through individual leaming, improve on them and 
transmit improved behaviors to the next generation. This process gives rise to 
social evolution. 23 
10. Selecting for Rule Preference 
Learning, whether social or individual, is concerned with recognizing 
regularities and recurrent patterns. These patterns, once recognized, help in 
guiding the individual's future behavior and eliminating that which is likely to fail. 
Learning prevents certain behaviors from being tried out. This strategy is certainly 
not the best, as it would be better to select the optimum solution in each specific 
case, but this is unrealistic; otherwise genetic encoding would have succeeded in 
producing such a response by now. The importance of an aesthetic sense to 
21 Hume-1740, p. 134. 
22 This is the theme in Lorenz-1973. 
23 See Cavalli-Sforza/Feldman-1981, Boyd/Richerson-1985. As the theoretical argument suggests, 
processes of social learning and social evolution are not restricted to humans, but widespread in the 
animal kingdom, and give rise to a host of animal cultures and animal traditions; see Avital and 
Jablonka (in preparation). 
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enabling learning offers an argument for why we find individuals endowed with 
aesthetic preferences.24 But we can go further. 
Learning relates to novelty, and to detecting newly occurring patterns. In 
order to detect these, the individual must be interested in finding such patterns. 
Without an active interest in observing resemblances, analogies, and regularities 
spanning certain categories, they would go undetected. Take two individuals: One 
is interested in finding patterns, the other is not. In every other respect, both 
individuals are absolutely identical. Assume further that the environment is such 
that fitness can be increased by learning, either because it enables individuals to 
benefit by assimilating the knowledge encoded in the culture they live in, or by 
exploiting some idiosyncratic features of their particular habitat more effectively. 
Under these circumstances we must assume that an active desire for pattern 
recognition will increase fitness. The more curious individual - the one who likes 
and enjoys detecting patterns, similarities, and analogies - will be more successful 
than the disinterested one. In this way, we must assume natural selection to mould 
a sense of beauty, and an active desire to uncover patterns, just as we are endowed 
with a preference for nutritious food. 25 
As an aside, let me note that many inorganic things strike us as beautiful: 
crystals, rocks, a rainbow, the shapes of clouds, a waterfall in the sun. That we 
perceive these structures as beautiful indicates that our sense of beauty is tuned to 
such things, and there is a selective value in having such a taste. Furthermore, 
many aspects of beauty in animals, like the leopard's spots, have been traced back 
to the nature of physical and chemical processes, which severely channel and 
constrain both natural and sexual selection.26 This strengthens, again, the point 
that aesthetic judgements are not arbitrary but reflect the structure of the universe 
in a deep sense for reasons we cannot easily understand. 
This is highlighted also by the observation that the power of aesthetic 
judgements in uncovering the laws of nature is absolutely stunning. The physicist 
Paul Dirac was prompted by aesthetic reasons to reformulate an equation for the 
electron, which then led to the successful prediction of antimatter. He thought that 
'it is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit the 
experiment. '27 In a similar vein, the physicist Roger Penrose holds that 'rigorous 
24 Proponents of focal point arguments, like Schelling-1969 and Sugden-1986 rely in this sense on 
aesthetic judgement, but do not relate this to an aesthetic preference which is central for my own theory 
CSchlicht-1998). 
25 1bis argument has its limits, because curiosity and playfulness come at the cost of wasting time. We 
may, thus, postulate that evolution has settled for an appropriate level of such endeavors. Further, the 
above argument assumes that the desire to uncover and enjoy patterns is what we call the sense of 
beauty. 
26 Goodwin-1994. Note that these arguments differ: The fact that inorganic patterns strike us as 
beautiful can be interpreted in two different ways. One possibility (emphasized by Lorenz-1973) is that 
our aesthetic judgement has evolved because the physical world has properties that selected for 
correspondence between perception, cognition, and aspects of non-organic reality. The other 
possibility is that internal constraints such as those emerging from the way our nervous system is 
organized, provide the anchor for our aesthetic sense. For our present purposes we need not opt for 
one alternative or the other; and both may interact. 
27 Davies-1992, p. 176. 
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argument is usually the last step! Before that, one has to make many guesses, and 
for these, aesthetic convictions are enormously important.'28 It has been noted that 
'there is something curious here. If beauty is entirely biologically programmed, 
selected for survival value alone, it is all the more surprising to see it re-emerge in 
the esoteric world of fundamental physics, which has no direct connection with 
biology. On the other hand, if beauty is more than mere biology at work, if our 
aesthetic appreciation stems from contact with something firmer and more 
pervasive, then it is surely a fact of major significance that the fundamental laws of 
the universe reflect this "something". '29 
This was just an aside to illustrate the astonishing power of aesthetic 
considerations in theory formation. We are not concerned here with these deep 
issues, but rather with everyday learning phenomena which build, however, on the 
same tendencies of thinking which guide the physicist in solving the riddles of the 
universe. 
11. Conclusion 
The point made in this paper is that aesthetic judgements and an associated 
active desire to uncover, maintain, and expand regularities is the source of rule 
formation in social interaction. The argument can be briefly restated as follows: All 
learning and extrapolation presupposes aesthetic judgements concerning 
Similarity, analogy, simplicity, and straightforwardness. Learning has evolved as a 
response to changing environments, where genetic adaptation is too slow. It is, 
28 Davies-1992, p. 177. I must be added here that Einstein placed great emphasis on the 'truly religious 
conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect and susceptible to the rational striving for 
knowledge.' Here, 'perfection' cannot refer to purpose and must be, thus, taken as a judgement of an 
aesthetic kind. Einstein remarks that the search for perfection is of importance for the development of 
science: 'If this conviction had not been a strongly emotional one and if those searching for knowledge 
had not been inspired by Spinoza's Amor Dei InteJ/ectuaJis.they would hardly have been capable of 
that untiring devotion which alone enables man to attain his greatest achievements. '  (Einstein-1954, 
p. 52) 
29 Davies-1992, p. 176. Note, however, that Darwin took beauty not so much as biologically 
programmed, but rather as programming biological selection, and in particular sexual selection. This 
contrasts with modem treatments like Barrow's (Barrow-1995) which speculate that the human sense of 
beauty is shaped by the neolithic conditions our ancestors were exposed to. According to this 
argument, we like savannah-type landscapes because these provided the most comfortable 
environment for our Neolithic ancestors (Barrow-1995, p. 92; see also Richter-l999). Such arguments 
fall short of explaining why a polar landscape strikes us as beautiful and, more importantly, it does not 
address the universal aspects of beauty judgements which were Darwin's central concern. 
The thought that learning presupposes an aesthetic sense may contribute to approach the issue in a 
Darwinian spirit. If the sense of beauty were fully adaptive, the pea-hen would prefer males with 
shorter tails for fitness reasons. This rules out the adaptive explanations mentioned above. If the 
aesthetic sense is shaped with respect to the efficacy of learning processes, however, it may entail those 
inefficiencies in sexual selection Darwin was concerned with (Darwin-1874). Our sense of beauty 
would then be adaptive with respect to learning, but would imply inefficiencies in other dimensions, 
like the peacock's tail. 
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however, not a passive phenomenon as it becomes particularly effective if the 
individual tries to actively uncover and exploit regularities in its environment. 
Hence evolutionary forces have instilled a rule preference - a desire to uncover, 
maintain, and expand patterns - as part and parcel of human nature. This rule 
preference gives rise to rule formation in social interaction. The argument ' 
provides, thus, an evolutionary underpinning for the 'clarity' view of custom. 
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